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Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B. L.
141 S. Ct. 2042 (2021)
I.

INTRODUCTION

Although the First Amendment guarantees United States citizens
freedom of speech, a person’s speech may be regulated in certain situations,
particularly when that person is a student in a school.1 Over the years, the
Supreme Court has often been called on to determine whether a school has
gone too far in restricting a student’s speech, and in 2021, the Court issued a
decision in one such case, Mahanoy Area School District v. B. L.2 Unlike
prior cases, such as the Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District decision that concerned the rights of on-campus students, Mahanoy
attempted to clarify what rights, if any, schools have in regulating off-campus
speech.3
The case involved B. L., a high school student who filed suit to challenge
her suspension from the cheerleading team.4 Due to her frustration from
failing to make the varsity cheerleading team and from not earning her desired
position in softball, B. L., on a Saturday while off school grounds, used
Snapchat to post disparaging remarks about the school and the extracurricular
programs.5 The Court, with an 8-1 majority, sided with B. L., holding that
the school district had overreached in asserting its authority over B. L. while
she was off-campus.6 Although the majority provided no definition for offcampus speech and no test for determining what types of off-campus speech
schools might regulate, the Court clearly voiced its hesitancy in allowing
schools to punish students for what they say while out of the classroom.7
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In the spring of 2017, B. L., a high school freshman, learned that she had
not made the varsity cheerleading squad.8 Instead, she was offered a position
1. U.S. CONST., amend. I.
2. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B. L., 141 S. Ct. 2042 (2021).
3. Id. at 2042-43; see generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969).
4. Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2043.
5. Id.
6. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B. L., 210 L. Ed. 2d 403, 408 (2021).
7. Id. at 407.
8. Adam Liptak, A Cheerleader’s Vulgar Message Prompts a First Amendment Showdown, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/28/us/supreme-court-schools-free-speech.ht
ml.
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on the junior varsity cheerleading team.9 B. L. was upset that she was placed
on the junior varsity rather than the varsity squad, particularly because
another student, an eighth grader at the time, had been selected for the varsity
team.10 About the same time that she tried out for cheerleading, B. L. also
tried out for the right-fielder’s position on a private softball team; she was
denied this spot on the team as well.11
On a Saturday when school was not in session, B. L. and a friend went to
a local convenience store.12 At the store, B. L. accessed Snapchat, a social
media application, using her smartphone and posted two photos.13 This
posting allowed users of the application who were included in B. L.’s “friend”
group to see her photos for a limited amount of time, after which the images
would no longer be accessible.14 At the time of the posting, B. L. had close
to 250 persons in her “friend” group.15
The first of the two photos that B. L. posted displayed B. L. and her friend
extending their middle fingers toward the camera with the caption, “[F]***
school f*** softball f*** cheer f*** everything.”16 The second photo
contained a blank image and the caption, “Love how me and [another student]
get told we need a year of jv before we make varsity but tha[t] doesn’t matter
to anyone else?”17 Following the caption in the second image was an emoji
of an upside-down smiley face.18
Of the roughly 250 members in B. L.’s “friend” group, many were
Mahanoy Area High School students, and a few of them also belonged to the
cheerleading squad.19 One of the students took screenshots of B. L.’s photos
before they expired and proceeded to share the copies of the Snapchat images
with some of the other cheerleaders.20 A student shared the copies with her
mother, who was a cheerleading squad coach.21 In response to the shared
images, several of the cheerleaders expressed their displeasure with B. L.’s
photos.22 The photos were a topic of discussion during an Algebra class
taught by one of the cheerleading coaches.23
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2043.
Id.
Id.
Liptak, supra note 8.
Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2043.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2043.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2043.
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The cheerleading coaches approached the school principal about the
matter.24 Based on one post’s use of profanity and both posts’ relation to a
school-based extracurricular activity, the coaches determined that the
Snapchat images violated school policy.25 Due to her infraction, the
cheerleading coaches suspended B. L. from the junior varsity squad for her
upcoming sophomore year.26 B. L. apologized for her actions, but the school
administrators and the school board upheld B. L.’s one-year suspension.27
B. L., along with her parents, filed a lawsuit against the Mahanoy Area
School District in Federal District Court.28 The District Court held in favor
of B. L., granting both a temporary restraining order and a preliminary
injunction that mandated B. L.’s reinstatement on the cheerleading team.29
The court granted B. L.’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the
shared photos were not the source of a “substantial disruption at the school.”30
Based on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District, the District Court felt that unless the speech in
question caused a substantial disruption to school affairs, it should not be
prohibited.31 The District Court ruled that B. L.’s suspension infringed on
her First Amendment rights and awarded her nominal damages and attorneys’
fees.32 The court also required that B. L.’s disciplinary record be expunged.33
Mahanoy Area School District appealed the decision to the Third
Circuit.34 The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling but for
different reasons than those that the original court offered.35 The Circuit
Court held that because the Snapchat postings occurred off school grounds
and were not part of any school-related gathering, Mahanoy Area School
District did not have the authority to discipline B. L. for the postings.36 The
Third Circuit emphasized that the Tinker ruling does not pertain to speech
that was conducted off school property and was not “reasonably interpreted
as bearing the school’s imprimatur.”37 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
in order to decide whether Tinker would allow public school officials to

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2043.
Id.
Id. at 2043-44.
Id.; see also Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2044.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2044.
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regulate off-campus speech that may be deemed a substantial disruption to
the educational process.38
COURT’S DECISION AND RATIONALE

III.

A. Majority Opinion by Justice Breyer
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices
Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett and Chief Justice
Roberts.39 The Court began by quoting the holding in Tinker: “[S]tudents do
not ‘shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression,’ even
‘at the schoolhouse gate.’”40 In Tinker, a group of students were punished by
school officials for wearing black armbands to display opposition to the
Vietnam War.41 The Court said that school officials may regulate students’
speech only if it can be shown that the speech would “‘materially and
substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school.’”42 In Tinker, the Court expanded upon this notion,
stating that “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not
enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.”43 The Court found
that the students in Tinker had not caused a significant disturbance and,
therefore, ruled against the school district.44
Next, the Mahanoy Court discussed three Tinker-rule exceptions in which
school officials may regulate school speech.45 First, speech may be regulated
to prevent “‘indecent,’ ‘lewd,’ or ‘vulgar’ speech uttered during a school
assembly on school grounds.”46 The Court referred to Bethel School District
v. Fraser, in which a student was disciplined after promoting a fellow student
for class office in a speech that contained an extended, explicit sexual
metaphor.47 The Fraser Court held that the student’s speech was “offensively
lewd” and, thus, that the First Amendment does “not prevent . . . school

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Mahanoy, 210 L. Ed. 2d at 408.
Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2044 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byers, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir.1966)).
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
Id. at 514; see also Justin Driver, THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE: PUBLIC EDUCATION, THE
SUPREME COURT, AND THE BATTLE FOR THE AMERICAN MIND 77 (1st ed. 2018) (“The school witnessed
no threats of violence – let alone violent acts – and . . . schoolwork had not been compromised. The
virtually nonexistent record of actual disruption could hardly justify the schools’ decision to silence student
speech.”).
45. Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2045.
46. Id.; see also Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
47. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677-78.
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officials from determining that . . . a vulgar and lewd speech such as
respondent’s would undermine the school’s basic educational mission.”48
A second exception to Tinker is for speech “uttered, during a class trip,
that promotes “illegal drug use.”49 In Morse v. Frederick, at an event
sanctioned and supervised by a high school in Alaska, a student displayed a
banner reading “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”50 The principal of the school asked
the student to remove the banner, and when he refused, the principal
suspended the student.51 The Morse Court found that the banner arguably
promoted a pro-drug message.52 Because of the recognized dangers of drugrelated abuse and since the speech was at a school-related event, the Morse
Court held that school boards may “restrict student expression that they
reasonably regard as promoting drug use.”53
The third and final exception discussed by the Mahanoy Court involved
a school district’s ability to restrict speech that “others may reasonably
perceive as ‘bear[ing] the imprimatur of the school.’”54 In Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier, the issue was whether school officials could forbid the
printing of two stories in a school newspaper.55 The principal of the high
school publishing the paper determined that the two articles were
inappropriate and not in accordance with journalistic ethics.56 The Kuhlmeier
Court held that the Tinker standard did not apply in this situation and that the
First Amendment would not be violated by school officials “exercising
editorial control over the style and content of student speech in schoolsponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related
to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”57
Following the discussion of the Tinker exceptions, the Mahanoy Court
affirmed its general disagreement with the Third Circuit, which held that
“special characteristics that give schools additional license to regulate school
48. Id. at 685; see also Driver, supra note 44, at 94 (It may be worth noting that Chief Justice
“Burger stopped shy of concluding that Fraser’s speech substantial disrupted or materially interfered with
school activities, evidently because – even according to the testimony of Bethel’s educators – raucous
speeches and boisterous conduct were hardly unknown at Bethel’s student assemblies.”).
49. Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2045; see also Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007).
50. Morse, 551 U.S. at 397.
51. Id. at 398.
52. Id. at 402.
53. Id. at 408; see also Driver, supra note 44, at 116 (The author of the majority opinion, Chief
Justice “Roberts took pains to emphasize that Frederick should not be construed as authorizing schools to
punish students for speech that could not rationally be viewed as pro-drug.”).
54. Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2045 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271
(1988)).
55. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 262.
56. Id. at 263.
57. Id. at 273; see also Driver, supra note 44, at 104 (“The students produce[d] the newspaper as
part of Journalism II, a graded academic class held during regular school hours, but educators oversaw the
entire endeavor, exercising ultimate editorial authority.”).
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speech always disappear when a school regulates speech that takes place off
campus.”58 The Court recognized several circumstances, contained within
parties’ and amici briefs, in which a school district may still have an interest
in regulating speech.59 These circumstances involve “serious or severe
bullying or harassment”; “threats aimed at teachers or other students”; a
failure to adhere to rules or instructions concerning assignments, including
those involved in “online school activities”; and, finally, “breaches of school
security devices.”60
The Court in Mahanoy acknowledged that the above examples may
constitute situations in which off-campus speech may be regulated.61
However, the Court refused to say that this is the complete list and also
avoided giving a specific rule for determining what types of off-campus
speech schools may restrict.62 In fact, due to the increase in online and hybrid
types of schooling, the Court refrained from even defining the term “offcampus speech.”63 Instead, the Court delineated “three features of offcampus speech that often . . . distinguish schools’ efforts to regulate that
speech from their efforts to regulate on-campus speech.”64
First, the Court explained that in situations involving off-campus speech,
the school will “rarely stand in loco parentis.”65 Under the doctrine of in loco
parentis, school officials are charged with acting as the students’ absent
parents.66 Off-campus speech often falls within the parents’ usual realm of
control, meaning that the parents are not knowingly ceding any of their
parental rights to the school.67 Thus, off-campus speech would normally be
considered the responsibility of the parents and not that of school officials.68
Second, since the ruling in Tinker, a student’s on-campus speech may be
subject to restrictions not necessarily applicable if the student were offcampus.69 If the Court were to allow school officials to regulate off-campus
speech with the same guidelines as on-campus speech, a student would
essentially have all twenty-four hours of his or her speech under the control
of school officials.70 The Court acknowledged that this would be a less-than-

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2045.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2045.
Id. at 2046.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. 2046.
Id.; Morse, 551 U.S. at 405.
Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2046.
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ideal position for the nation’s students.71 Because of the potential for overregulation, the Court cautioned that school officials’ attempts to regulate offcampus speech must meet a higher level of scrutiny.72 School districts
seeking to censor students’ off-campus speech must meet more stringent
requirements than when they regulate on-campus speech.73
Lastly, the Court emphasized that schools have “an interest in protecting
a student’s unpopular expression, especially when the expression takes place
off campus.”74 Schools are meant to foster, not hamper, an environment for
the free exchange of ideas and opinions.75 The Court described schools as
having a responsibility to cultivate all types of speech, both popular and
unpopular, in order to train well-rounded citizens for the future.76
In Part III of the Court’s opinion, B. L.’s actual words were examined.77
The Court said that while B. L.’s speech may be made up of “vulgar
language,” the words and images could neither be considered “fighting
words” (“those by which their very utterance inflict injury or intend to incite
an immediate breach of the peace”)78 nor be classified as “obscene” (words
that “must be, in some significant way, erotic”).79 Instead, the Court
described B. L.’s speech as “pure speech,” saying that if B. L. had posted the
same images and language as an adult, the “First Amendment would provide
strong protection.”80
The Court also considered the time and place in which B. L.’s speech
occurred.81 The Snapchat posts occurred after official school hours at a
location that was not on school grounds.82 The Court specifically detailed the
information that was missing from B. L.’s post: B. L. neither included the
name of the school, nor identified any specific member of the school
faculty.83 The Court also emphasized the importance of the fact that B. L.
intended the posts for her group of “friends” and not a public audience.84
The Court next assessed the school’s interest in “prohibiting students
from using vulgar language to criticize a school team or its coaches.”85 The
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2046.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Chaplinsky v. N.H., 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2046 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19-20 (1971)).
Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2046-47 (citing Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 461 (2011)).
Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2047.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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analysis of this interest comprised three parts.86 First, the Court evaluated the
school’s need to discipline bad-mannered language directed against schoolrelated groups.87 While school officials may have considered B. L.’s
language vulgar, their interest in punishing this language diminished because
the speech occurred off campus.88 Here the Court referred again to Bethel
School District v. Fraser.89 In that case, a concurring opinion from Justice
Brennan indicated that although a student delivered a speech with an
inappropriate sexual innuendo, if the student had “given the same speech
outside of the school environment, he could not have been penalized simply
because government officials considered his language to be inappropriate.”90
In addition, the Court held that the school had not been given disciplinary
control by B. L.’s parents; thus, school officials did not stand in loco
parentis.91 The Court also noted that the school district did not put forth
evidence of a widespread effort to curb students’ vulgar language off school
grounds.92 Because of the off-campus nature of the speech, the lack of
disciplinary standing, and the missing evidence of a concerted effort to
prevent offensive speech outside of the classroom, the Court found “that the
school’s interest in teaching good manners is not sufficient . . . to overcome
B. L.’s interest in free expression.”93
Following its examination of the school’s interest in discouraging vulgar
language, the Court analyzed the school’s interest in attempting to prevent
disruptions within the school.94 The Court could find no evidence of
substantial disruption during the school day or during any school
extracurricular activities.95 Although there was a reported discussion during
an Algebra class in which some of B. L.’s fellow cheerleaders discussed being
“upset” by her posts, the Court interpreted this interaction as a minimal
distraction.96 To have reached the level of Tinker, a disruption would have
had to have been substantial, and the Court found that the Algebra discussion
did not qualify as such.97
Finally, the school district brought forth evidence that school officials
acted to prevent a decline in “team morale.”98 The Court found very little to
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2047.
Id.
Id.
Id.; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2047.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2047-48.
Id. at 2048; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2048.
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suggest a weakening in team morale and discovered no significant evidence
that any dip in team morale would create a disruption in the educational
process.99
Again, the Court pointed to Tinker, which stated that
“‘undifferentiated fear or apprehension . . . is not enough to overcome the
right to freedom of expression.’”100
The Court held that the school’s interests, whether to promote good
manners, to prevent or quash a substantial disruption, or to protect team
morale, were not strong enough to justify censoring B. L.’s speech.101 As the
majority acknowledged, although B. L.’s speech may be described as
“superfluous,” it is still worthy of protection under the First Amendment.102
The Court affirmed the Third Circuit’s judgment, though for different
reasons, and agreed that B. L. should not have been punished.103
B. Concurring Opinion by Justice Alito, with Whom Justice Gorsuch
Joins
Justice Alito began by acknowledging that B. L.’s case was the first in
which the Court was asked whether school officials can regulate off-campus
speech.104 He emphasized that Tinker did not settle any matters regarding
off-campus speech.105 Justice Alito agreed with the majority’s holding that
at times a school district might find it essential to restrict off-campus speech,
and, like the majority, he also found it unnecessary to make a rule concerning
application of the First Amendment to off-campus speech cases.106
Justice Alito examined how this case turned on the fact that B. L. was a
public-school student rather than a private-school student.107 In Tinker, the
Court held that “when a public school regulates student speech, it acts as an
arm of the State in which it is located.”108 Justice Alito concluded that had
B. L. been a private-school student, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
would have had no legal standing in suppressing her speech or disciplining
her for it.109
Justice Alito agreed with the majority’s opinion that public schools
should be able to regulate on-campus speech, recognizing that teachers’ and
administrators’ jobs would be incredibly difficult if they were not able to
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id. (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508).
Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2048.
Id.
Id.
Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2048 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 2048 n.1.
Id. at 2049.
Id. at 2049-50.
Id. at 2050 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509).
Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2050.
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control, to some extent, what type of speech occurred in schools.110 However,
Justice Alito questioned why a student enrolled in a public school must accept
that this type of regulation should occur.111 He answered this question by
stating that when parents enroll a student in public school, they implicitly
“consent on behalf of the child to the relinquishment of some of the child’s
free-speech rights.”112 This relinquishment of rights causes public school
officials to be in loco parentis.113 Justice Alito emphasized that the scope of
a parent’s delegation of rights over a child depends on the scope of an
educator’s charged duties.114 He illustrated that the assigned rights of an
educator at a boarding school may differ from those of an educator in a lesser
role, such as a part-time tutor.115 The boarding school teacher would likely
be tasked with more responsibility for monitoring and correcting a live-in
student than a part-time tutor would.116
In Part III of his concurring opinion, Justice Alito discussed the potential
scope of delegated school authority over modern public school students.117
He explained that the doctrine of in loco parentis applies throughout the
school day, both when students are receiving instruction and when they are
on school grounds but not engaged in a lesson (for example, eating lunch,
sitting in study hall, or transitioning to classes).118 However, in Part IV,
Justice Alito emphasized that, while parents may delegate some rights for
school officials to restrict off-campus speech, it is not “a complete transfer of
parental authority.”119 He examined several different types of off-campus
speech that school officials may have the authority to regulate.120
First, he found that speech that relates to a “temporal or spatial extension
of the regular school program,” such as hybrid learning, online learning,
school assignments meant to take place after class, and also school-provided
transportation to and from school, would all fall under the authority of the
school district.121 In this category, Justice Alito included extracurricular
events, field trips, and other school-sanctioned trips or occasions that may
take place off school grounds during or outside school hours.122 He agreed

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id. at 2050-51.
Id. at 2051.
Id.
Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2051.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2052.
Id. at 2053.
Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2053.
Id. at 2054.
Id.
Id.
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with the majority that this type of speech likely falls under a school district’s
ability to regulate.123
However, Justice Alito distinguished that type of speech from speech that
does not concern or relate to school officials, students, or the school itself and
that “addresses matters of public concern . . . like politics, religion, and social
relations.”124 He argued that school officials trying to suppress this type of
off-campus speech would likely be trying only to avoid disruptions, and while
a “school may suppress the disruption . . .[,] it may not punish the off-campus
speech that prompted other students to engage in misconduct.”125 Justice
Alito found speech pertaining to these public issues outside of the authority
of school officials.126
Justice Alito acknowledged that there are categories of speech that fall
between the type that occurs in some school-related fashion and the kind that
does not relate to school but that involves some matter of public concern.127
One such example is speech involving a threat to either a school official or a
student.128 Another category is “speech that criticizes or derides school
administrators, teachers, or other staff members.”129 The final category listed
is speech that involves derogatory remarks that a student makes toward other
students.130 Justice Alito admitted that each of these “in-between” categories
creates difficult issues for deciding whether or not off-campus speech may be
regulated.131
In Part V of his concurring opinion, Justice Alito concluded that B. L.’s
speech did not fall into one of the “in-between” categories.132 While B. L.’s
posts were critical of the school and of the cheerleading program, they were
not “speech that criticizes or derides particular individuals.”133 In fact, the
posts were meant to stay private; they were sent via an application that
allowed them to be viewed for only twenty-four hours, and they would not
have reached school officials if one of the recipients of the original posts had
not informed the school.134 In addition, like the majority, Justice Alito agreed
that B. L.’s language and images did not cause any significant school

123. Id. at 2054-55.
124. Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2055; see also Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 235 (2014) (“Speech by
citizens on matters of public concern lies at the heart of the First Amendment”).
125. Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2056.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 2057.
130. Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2057.
131. Id. at 2056.
132. Id. at 2057.
133. Id. at 2058.
134. Id.
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disruption.135 When examining B. L.’s specific language, he admitted that
some readers may have found the language upsetting or crude.136 However,
also like the majority, Justice Alito found no evidence of the school district
trying to curb offensive language and gestures for all students either on or off
campus.137
In the end, Justice Alito agreed with the majority’s finding that offcampus speech may be regulated only under specific circumstances and that
those unique situations should be limited.138 Although, like the majority, he
did not create a clear rule, Justice Alito stressed that, because of the weighty
First Amendment issues, school officials should “proceed cautiously” when
looking to regulate off-campus speech.139
C. Dissenting Opinion by Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas agreed with the majority that on-campus student speech
may be regulated under the doctrine of in loco parentis.140 He also found, as
the majority did, that schools have less authority in restricting speech that
occurs off campus.141 However, Justice Thomas asserted that the majority
ignored a historical rule, which would allow school officials to discipline B.
L. for her speech disparaging the school and the cheerleading team.142
For the most part, Justice Thomas relied on a Vermont Supreme Court
ruling from 1859, Lander v. Seaver.143 In Lander, after school dismissed, a
student riding by the home of one of his teachers referred to the teacher as
“Old Jack Seaver.”144 The teacher and several other students were present
when the student uttered the statement.145 The following day, the teacher
whipped the student with a piece of rawhide as punishment for his actions.146
The Vermont Supreme Court held that the student’s language had a “direct
and immediate tendency to injure the school and bring the master’s authority
into contempt.”147 Because of this language, the Vermont Supreme Court
found that the teacher had a right to discipline the student for his speech.148

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2058.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2059.
Id.
Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2059 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114, 115 (1859).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 120.
Id.
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Justice Thomas described the rule in Lander as “widespread” and said
that it has been applied as “not only the basis for schools to discipline
disrespectful speech but also to regulate truancy.”149 He discussed Lander’s
impact on truancy, noting that courts in the 1800s did not clearly distinguish
between a student’s speech and his or her conduct.150 Because of this
ambiguity, courts used Lander as a means to punish students for their offcampus truancies’ negative impacts on the “‘good order and discipline of the
school.’”151 Following the example of Lander, Justice Thomas firmly
concluded that the historical rule has consistently allowed the regulation of
off-campus speech that directly and immediately harmed “the school, its
faculty or students, or its programs.”152
Justice Thomas claimed that the majority offered no reason to abandon
the historical rule; thus, he argued that it should apply in B. L.’s case.153 He
found that B. L.’s language was vulgar and meant to damage the reputation
of the cheerleading program, its staff, and its participants.154 Because of the
nature of her posts, Justice Thomas would have applied the historical rule,
allowing the cheerleading coach to have suspended B. L. for her off-campus
speech.155 He also suggested that if B. L. had disagreed with the severity of
the punishment, she could have sought a remedy in state court. Justice
Thomas declared that he did not believe that federal courts had any authority
to “police the proportionality of school disciplinary decisions in the name of
the First Amendment.”156
Justice Thomas further discussed the doctrine of in loco parentis, saying
that the Court had failed to apply the principle appropriately since its ruling
in Tinker.157 He asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified at a
time when public school officials were widely considered “delegated
substitutes of parents” and that this doctrine allowed them to be unbound by
“the constraints the Fourteenth Amendment placed on other government
actors.”158 Justice Thomas explained his frustration with the Tinker ruling,
writing that when the Court said that “it ‘ha[d] been the unmistakable holding
. . . for almost 50 years’ that students have free-speech rights inside schools,”
149. Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2060.
150. Id.
151. Id. (quoting Deskins v. Gose, 85 Mo. 485, 489 (1885)); see also Burdick v. Babcock, 31 Iowa
562, 567 (1871) (“If the effects of acts done out of school-hours reach within the schoolroom during school
hours and are detrimental to good order and the best interest of the pupils, it is evident that such acts may
be forbidden.”).
152. Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2061.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2061-62.
158. Id. at 2061.
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it did not point to cases that actually supported this claim.159 Instead, Justice
Thomas stressed that the Tinker majority referred to cases that primarily dealt
with “the rights of parents and private schools, not students.”160 He argued
that, like the Tinker majority, the current Court also failed to show how or if
the doctrine of in loco parentis may be applied to off-campus speech.161
The Tinker decision’s lack of a “solid foundation” made deciding this
case very difficult in Justice Thomas’s opinion.162 He acknowledged that B.
L.’s use of technology to produce speech that was “made in one location but
capable of being received in countless others” was a problem that really could
not have been predicted at the time of the Tinker decision.163 However,
Justice Thomas opined that the Court should have recognized the need to
better explain Tinker and, in B. L.’s case, should have formed an opinion that
would have analyzed the historical issues around free speech regulation by
school officials and that would have described how and why these issues were
being modified or left alone.164
Justice Thomas concluded that the majority should have given more
weight to the facts that B. L. had chosen to participate in an extracurricular
activity and that her speech concerned that activity.165 He said that in the
Lander case, the focus of the analysis was on the “effect of the speech, not its
location.”166 Because B. L. was a member of the cheerleading team and
because part of her Snapchat posts specifically targeted that organization, in
Justice Thomas’s opinion, B. L.’s language was more damaging to the
cheerleading squad than if the same posts had been made by someone not on
the team.167 Therefore, in his view, B. L.’s speech carried more weight than
similar speech made by a non-cheerleader, and the majority missed this detail
in its analysis.168
Justice Thomas also posited that the majority should have discussed the
type and scope of authority schools may have in disciplining students for
speech posted on social media.169 He recognized that language and images
transmitted through social media have a wider impact and reach greater
numbers of people than regular speech.170 He emphasized that off-campus
speech shared through social media “will have a greater proximate tendency
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 2062 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).
Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2062.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2062.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2062.
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to harm the school environment than will an off-campus in-person
conversation.”171 He wrote that the majority should have discussed whether
school officials should have more authority in disciplining off-campus speech
distributed through social media than in disciplining in-person, off-campus
speech.172
Finally, Justice Thomas found that the majority did not delve into the
issue of whether B. L.’s speech could actually be described as off campus.173
Although B. L. certainly authored the Snapchat posts at an off-campus
location, their impact could possibly be felt on campus.174 He compared this
situation to that of a student who might pass out vulgar fliers on campus after
having created the fliers off campus.175 In that scenario, Justice Thomas
affirmed that a school would be acting in loco parentis in disciplining the
student for distributing the fliers.176 As Justice Thomas stated, “[W]here it is
foreseeable and likely that speech will travel onto campus, a school has a
stronger claim to treating the speech as on-campus speech.”177
Justice Thomas conceded that, ultimately, it is probably more reasonable
to consider B. L.’s speech as off campus in nature due to a lack of meaningful
evidence that the original posts were received on campus.178 Only a copy of
B. L.’s posts were seen on school grounds.179 However, he chastised the
majority for simply assuming that the speech had to be considered off campus
and not analyzing the location label in greater depth.180
In Justice Thomas’s view, the majority stated only one rule: “Schools can
regulate speech less often when that speech occurs off campus.”181 He
declared that this rule is “untethered from anything stable,” saying that
“courts (and schools) will almost certainly be at a loss as to what exactly the
Court’s opinion today means.”182 Because the majority neither based its
ruling on a historical perspective of free speech regulation by schools nor
explained its choice to deviate from these historical rules, Justice Thomas
disagreed with the Court’s holding.183

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2063.
Id.
Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2063.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2063.
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ANALYSIS
A. Introduction

In Tinker, the Supreme Court made it clear that school officials do not
have free license to regulate all displays of speech in schools.184 Specifically,
the Court held that speech could not be restricted unless it “‘materially and
substantially interfere[d] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in
the operation of the school.’”185 This ruling clearly impacted the suppression
of on-campus speech; however, it did little to resolve the matter of schools’
authority over off-campus speech.186 In Mahanoy, the Court attempted to
pour the foundation for a rule dealing with off-campus speech, but it failed to
offer a solid test or process for applying this rule. It is difficult to imagine
how courts and schools will implement this ambiguous and elusive holding
from Mahanoy when confronted with off-campus First Amendment disputes.
Instead of a solid precedent for future issues, the Court leaves several
unanswered questions.
This analysis will discuss why the Court correctly held that B. L.’s speech
was protected and will examine some of the questions that the Court left
unanswered.
B. Based on Tinker, B. L.’s Speech Should be Protected
Simply based on the Tinker holding, it would seem that the majority
opinion is correct and that B. L.’s speech should be protected. While B. L.’s
speech concerned the school and two of its extracurricular programs, Tinker
demands more than just critical speech to enable a school district to punish a
student; the speech must “‘materially and substantially interfere with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.’”187 The
Tinker test mandates that student speech may “only be suppressed or
regulated by school authorities if the expression would (1) substantially
interfere with the work of the school, or (2) obstruct the rights of other
students.”188 Neither of these two prongs was satisfied in Mahanoy.
According to the majority, the school presented no evidence of any
substantial disruption or interference.189 The Court found an Algebra class
discussion that lasted at most “5 to 10 minutes” inadequate to constitute a
184. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
185. Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byers, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir.1966)).
186. Joshua Rieger, Digitizing the Schoolhouse Gate: Protecting Students’ Off-Campus
Cyberspeech by Switching the Safety on Tinker’s Trigger, 70 FLA. L. REV. 695, 703 (2019).
187. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (quoting Burnside, 363 F.2d at 749).
188. John T. Ceglia, Comment, The Disappearing Schoolhouse Gate: Applying Tinker in the
Internet Age, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 939, 947-48 (2012).
189. Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2047 (majority opinion).
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serious disruption of the educational process.190 Although some students
complained that B. L.’s language bothered them, when a coach was asked
whether she thought the posts would cause any type of disruption, she said
they would not.191 Justice Alito, in his concurring opinion, agreed with the
majority, saying that “[t]he freedom of students to speak off-campus would
not be worth much if it gave way in the face of such relatively minor
complaints.”192 Based on the lack of a substantial interference and no clear
impingement of any other students’ rights, the Tinker standard is simply not
satisfied, and, thus, the Court rightly affirmed the overturning of B. L.’s
punishment.
In addition to the lack of a serious disruption, the Court also spent a great
deal of its opinion discussing the doctrine of in loco parentis and its
applicability in off-campus speech cases. The Court has held that parents
delegate some of their parental duties to schools while students are present
on campus.193 However, the majority asserted that in situations involving offcampus speech, it is less reasonable to believe that parents have ceded their
responsibilities to a school district.194 In his concurring opinion, Justice Alito
emphasized that, although there are some instances in which off-campus
speech may be regulated, “enrollment [in a public school] cannot be treated
as a complete transfer of parental authority over a student’s speech.”195
In B. L.’s case, the speech did not just occur off campus; it also occurred
outside the school’s hours of operation, specifically on the weekend.196
Historically, the doctrine of in loco parentis has tended to pertain “under
circumstances where the children’s actual parents cannot protect, guide, and
discipline them.”197 The Court elaborated upon this application when it said,
“Geographically speaking, off-campus speech will normally fall within the
zone of parental, rather than school-related, responsibility.”198 Since the
school provided no evidence of participating in some widespread program to
prevent students from using vulgar or critical language when off school
grounds, school officials had no reason to act on the behalf of the parents for
activities that occurred completely outside of the school’s setting.199 The
majority bluntly stated that “there is no reason to believe B. L.’s parents had
delegated to school officials their own control of B. L.’s behavior at the
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. at 2047-48.
Id. at 2048.
Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2058 (Alito, J., concurring).
Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2044-45 (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684) (majority opinion).
Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2046.
Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2053 (Alito, J., concurring).
Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2043 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2046.
Id.
Id.
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Cocoa Hut,” the location where B. L. created the Snapchat posts.200 B. L.’s
parents, not the school, stood in the best position to punish her for her actions,
if they so chose.
Because B. L.’s speech did not satisfy the Tinker standard and because
there was no indication that her parents had delegated, explicitly or implicitly,
their parental rights to govern B. L.’s off-campus behavior, the Court
correctly held that B. L.’s speech was protected.
C. Unanswered Questions
Perhaps the biggest omission in the Court’s opinion was any definition
of off-campus speech. At the end of his dissent, Justice Thomas rightly took
issue with the majority’s failure to give a reliable test for determining what
constitutes off-campus speech.201 In fact, in the majority opinion, Justice
Breyer wrote, “[W]e do not now set forth a broad, highly general First
Amendment rule stating just what counts as ‘off campus’ speech.”202
The majority opinion, instead of trying to define off-campus speech,
merely assumed that B. L.’s speech was, indeed, considered off-campus since
it originated after school hours and off school grounds.203 However, as
Justice Thomas discussed in his dissent, what if B. L. created the posts after
hours and off campus but students received them during school and on
campus?204 To Justice Thomas, this scenario was avoided in this case since
the only known versions of the posts that reached campus during school hours
were copies of the original Snapchats.205 If students received and read B. L.’s
original Snapchat posts on school grounds during school hours, would the
Court have still maintained that this was off-campus speech?
The majority chose to forgo this question and instead decided to deal with
B. L.’s situation specifically. Declaring B. L.’s speech to be off campus, the
majority then made clear its hesitancy to allow school officials to regulate
off-campus speech.206 However, the Court disagreed with the Third Circuit’s
majority ruling that dismissed Tinker as having any applicability over offcampus speech.207 Justice Breyer, in his majority opinion, indicated certain
types of off-campus speech that school districts should have the authority to
regulate.208 The Court listed four situations in which school officials may
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2047.
Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2063 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2045 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2047.
Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2063 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id.
Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2046 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2045.
Id.
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justifiably intervene and discipline students for their off-campus speech: (1)
“severe bullying or harassment targeting particular individuals;” (2) “threats
aimed at teachers or other students;” (3) “the failure to follow rules
concerning lessons, the writing of papers, the use of computers, or
participation in other online school activities;” and (4) “breaches of school
security devices, including material maintained within school computers.”209
The Court did not explain why it chose these categories or if there are other
potential situations in which a school might seek to censor or to restrict offcampus speech.210 If the Court had described its rationale better, lower courts
and schools would likely have better positions in the future to recognize
scenarios in which off-campus speech may not be tolerated.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Alito also discussed the different types
of off-campus speech that school officials may encounter.211 Like the
majority, he admitted that he had no intention of constructing a “test to be
used in judging the constitutionality of a public school’s effort to regulate
such speech.”212 However, Justice Alito gave more detail as to why he felt
B. L.’s speech required protection.
In addition to the categories listed by the majority, Justice Alito
introduced the category of derisive or critical speech aimed at school staff
members.213 Later in his opinion, he determined that B. L.’s speech did not
fall into any of the categories he discussed, including the one about restricting
critical or derisive speech toward school staff.214 However, he then expressed
his belief that B. L.’s speech was merely “criticism (albeit of a crude manner)
of the school and an extracurricular activity.”215 In his next sentence, he
wrote that “unflattering speech about a school or one of its programs is
different from speech that criticizes or derides particular individuals.”216
Thus, according to Justice Alito, the school could not regulate B. L.’s speech
because, rather than criticizing the cheerleading coach or any other staff
member, she simply criticized the program as a whole.217 Although the
majority opinion does not note this distinction, should lower courts and
schools attempt to differentiate between speech made about programs and
speech made about staff members when deciding the appropriateness of
regulating off-campus speech?

209.
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211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
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Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2056 (Alito, J., concurring).
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Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2057-58.
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In his dissent, Justice Thomas raised another important issue that the
majority completely sidestepped: What is the effect of speech transmitted
through social media? Justice Thomas questioned whether the fact that B. L.
distributed her speech via social media would give school officials even more
authority to regulate her speech.218 As he said, given social media’s ability
to impact, both positively and negatively, large numbers of people, it may be
worth asking whether school officials should receive greater leeway in
punishing students for their potentially offending speech.219 Justice Thomas
indicated that speech posted on social media likely will “have a greater
proximate tendency to harm the school environment than an off-campus inperson conversation.”220 If this view is true, when regulating speech
delivered through social media as opposed to speech communicated in
person, should schools exercise more vigilance in their methods?
For schools dealing with off-campus speech issues, the majority and
concurring opinions gave very little instruction as to when off-campus speech
is protected and when it may be punishable. The majority listed its four
categories for regulating speech, and Justice Alito indicated that critical
speech involving programs or the school as a whole require protections
whereas the same language directed at school officials may not necessarily
have any protections.221 While Justice Thomas questioned the impact of
social media on off-campus speech, the majority was silent on the issue.222
Unfortunately for school officials, while the Court armed them with slightly
more guidance than they had in the past, the difficulties of knowing when and
how they may regulate off-campus speech are still very present.
D. Conclusion
Tinker held that students do “not shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech at the schoolhouse gate” while providing certain
conditions under which student speech may be controlled.223 Mahanoy, while
providing very little as far as tests or definitions go, did attempt to provide
some clarification as to whether school officials have authority over offcampus speech. The majority confirmed the existence of several categories
of regulatable off-campus speech.224 Justice Alito, in his concurring opinion,

218. Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2062 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2045 (majority opinion); Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2057-58 (Alito, J.,
concurring).
222. Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2062 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
223. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
224. Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2045 (majority opinion).
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added a distinction between critical statements made toward a school or its
programs and those made toward school officials.225
Typically, an 8-1 majority clearly indicates a strong statement about what
the Court believes and how lower courts should act on certain issues.
However, in this case, it will likely be difficult for future courts and schools
to draw much guidance from Mahanoy in deciding similar free speech
controversies involving off-campus speech. Perhaps Justice Thomas was
correct when he said that, in the end, the majority provided just one rule:
“Schools can regulate speech less often when that speech occurs off
campus.”226 How much less has yet to be determined.
DANIEL W. GUDORF

225. Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2057-58 (Alito, J., concurring).
226. Mahanoy, 141 S. Ct. at 2063 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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